Anton Security Tip of the Week #13: Into the Darkness ... or The Ominous World of Unix Binary Audit Logs
Following the new “tradition” of posting a security tip of the week (mentioned here, here ; SANS jumped in as well), I decided to follow along and join the initiative. One of the bloggers called it “pay it forward” to the community.
So, Anton Security Tip of the Day #13: Into the Darkness … or The Ominous World of Unix Binary Audit Logs
In this tip, we will take a peek at one of the most esoteric areas of logging: Unix binary audit logs. Solaris BSM and Trusted Solaris auditing is the least unknown :-) example of it, even though other Unix vendors have similar auditing capabilities - see this for HP-UX Audit and this for IBM AIX audit. Linux kernel audit is also pretty much the same thing. If you look for information on ‘Solaris BSM audit logs’ , you’d find plenty of tips on how to enable such logging, a little on how to manage/rotate the log files, a bit on how to survive the resulting data deluge and ALMOST NOTHING on what to do with the log data, which is kinda sad :-) After looking at BSM logs for a while, I developed an opinion that nobody has ever looked at them on a regular basis :-)
So, let’s assume you enabled Solaris BSM kernel audit for user “root” and few other “interesting” users (there is no per-object logging in Solaris; other Unix’es do have it) via the following commonly recommended per-user configuration in /etc/security/audit_user:
This config pretty much records all the actions by the users listed. Now, you have audit files growing like shrooms in you /var/audit. What good does it give us? First, we need to convert the binary audit files into text - something along the lines of
# auditreduce -A /var/audit/20071127193515.not_terminated.SunUltra10 | praudit -l > /tmp/sol_box_11272007
will do. Now what? In this tip we will learn how use the audit logs to see who is trying to copy sensitive files off the system.
First, who is connecting out - lets’s search the logs for ‘connect’ calls (if you are using LogLogic for it, use Index Search for this task; if not, grep will have to do, but be prepared to wait). A few recommended searches:
- “connect AND 172.16.10.*” or “connect AND NOT 172.16.10.*” (to look for connection to specific IPs or to the outside networks) or simply ‘connect AND username’
Here is an example found (with connect, IP and user in bold):
header,103,2,connect(2),,Tue Nov 27 11:36:46 PST 2007, + 193 msec,argument,1,0x4,so,socket,0x0002,0x0002,0x80d6,SunUltra10,0x0016,10.1.1.41,subject,root,anton,other,anton,other,29902,29720,0 1611 172.16.0.173,return,success,0
At this point we already know the user name of the user who run that connecting process since it will be in the results (you can also the user to search as I showed above).
Next, what are those connections - let’s try to uncover which programs actually connected (BSM logs don’t make that easy). Let’s search for process starts in the same time frame:
- “execve AND NOT ls AND NOT <whatever other commands you don’t care to see>” will give you a list of started programs.
header,124,2,execve(2),,Tue Nov 27 11:36:46 PST 2007, + 115 msec,path,/usr/bin/scp,attribute,100555,root,bin,136,1573,0,subject,root,anton,other,anton,other,29901,29720,0 1611 172.16.0.173,return,success,0
Notice that both records have the same timestamps. Sadly, time and parent process ID ( which is in our case 29720) is all that correlates them together.
Finally, what file was affected (i.e. copied off the system via scp in this case) - more digging is in order; we again use the process ID and time. The easiest is to search for a file name or browse all records around the same time frame (might be A LOT!):
- “*secret.zip* AND anton” will work; we can add the above process ID and look for “anton AND 29720″ (but expect a lot of data since this is a shell process ID)
header,135,2,open(2) - read,,Tue Nov 27 11:36:47 PST 2007, + 900 msec,path,/tmp/not-so-secret.zip.gz,attribute,100600,anton,other,0,32743959,18446744073709551615,subject,root,anton,other,anton,other,29901,29720,0 1611 172.16.0.173,return,success,4
What do we know now? This user connected to this system and MAYBE copied this file via, MAYBE via scp. How cool is that? (A: not cool at all, since we are not sure!)
To conclude, if you can avoid dealing with Solaris BSM logs, please do so :-) On a more serious note, you now know why these logs were called “the ugliest logs ever.”
Even more seriously (but still pretty humorously), these logs are a classic example of trees that make every effort to obscure the forest, because they record syscalls and not processes or user actions (and connect, execve and read are all logged separately). There are also many, many more idiosyncrasies (and, in fact, idiocies) where these come from :-)
Also, I am tagging all the tips on my del.icio.us feed. Here is the link: All Security Tips of the Day.