Statistics that "acquire the power of language"

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Tim O'Reilly
Aug. 02, 2003 03:09 PM
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Here's a fabulous quote from James that gets this idea across: "To most people it no doubt seemed that I was writing about statistics, but I wasn't, not ever; in the years that I've been doing this book [his annual Baseball Abstract], I've written no more than a couple of articles about baseball statistics. The secret of the success of this book is that I was dead in the center of the discussion. I was writing about exactly the same issues that everybody else was talking about, only in a different way."

This thought cuts right to the heart of all the discussions I've had with my staff over the years about "critical business indicators." These shouldn't be arbitrary numbers that someone told us we ought to track, but ways of talking about what matters, "only in a different way."

In short, I'm completely inspired by this book. For those of you who don't know it, it's the story of how Billy Beane's Oakland A's became one of the most successful teams in baseball, with the second lowest payroll, using a new way of thinking, acting on statistics that others were ignoring. As Lewis says at the beginning of chapter 5, "When you think of intellectuals influencing the course of human affairs, you think of physics, or political theory, or economics. You think of John Maynard Keynes's condescending line about men of action--how they believe themselves guided by their own ideas even when they are unwittingly in the thrall of some dead economist. You don't think of baseball, because you don't think of baseball as having an intellectual underpinning. But it does; it had just never been seriously observed and closely questioned, in a writing style sufficiently compelling to catch the attention of the people who actually played baseball. Once it had been, it was only a matter of time--a long time--before some man of action seized on newly revealed truths to gain a competitive advantage."

I don't at all like a lot about the way Beane manages the A's, as described in this book -- the way he treats players as tradable commodities may make good baseball management, but it's a lousy way to build lasting loyalties. And his rages seem completely out of place in a business setting. But I love the way he studies and works on his business, rather than just accepting the received wisdom about what the knobs and levers ought to be.

(There are a few bits in the book about good people management, though. Having decided that the thing that really matters is on-base percentage, which is most driven by an ability to keep from swinging at things you can't hit (leading to a lot of walks, which most baseball teams apparently don't especially value), Beane put players in all kinds of odd positions defensively. For example, he put one guy who'd been a catcher for many years at first base, where the A's had an opening but where he was horrible. They wanted him because his on-base percentage was one of the best ever, and thought that outweighed the weaker fielding. But there's a great story about the way the infield coach worked with him: "His coach was creating an alternative scale on which Hatty could judge his performance. He might be an absolute D but on Wash's scale he felt like a B, and rising. 'He knew that what looked like a routine play wasn't a routine play for me,' said Hatty. Wash was helping him to fool himself, to make him feel better than he was, until he actually became better than he was." Now that's an ideal for managers to strive towards!)

Incidentally, Bill James, the subject of chapter four, strikes me as an absolutely brilliant writer. Who would expect the following in a book on baseball statistics? The unexpected leap in the last line is as good as anything I've ever read: "Every form of strength is also a form of weakness. Pretty girls tend to become insufferable because, being pretty, their faults are too much tolerated. Possessions entrap men, and wealth paralyzes them. I learned to write because I am one of those people who somehow cannot manage the common communications of smiles and gestures, but must use words to get across things that other people would never need to say." I like Michael Lewis' writing, but Bill James strikes me as a true original. The idiosyncratic writing of his self-published baseball abstracts from the mid-eighties has the freshness and personality that people like to claim for blogging. While it's the fruition and development of his ideas by Billy Beane and his team at the A's that is the subject of this book, it was the quotes from James that most conveyed to me the very heart of the idea.

P.S. Dale Dougherty, who loaned me the book in the first place, pointed me to a Slate interview with Bill James discussing the book. My favorite line: "There will always be people who are ahead of the curve, and people who are behind the curve. But knowledge moves the curve." Another nugget of wisdom from someone who clearly can teach us about a lot more than baseball!

Tim O'Reilly is the founder and CEO of O'Reilly Media, Inc., thought by many to be the best computer book publisher in the world. In addition to Foo Camps ("Friends of O'Reilly" Camps, which gave rise to the "un-conference" movement), O'Reilly Media also hosts conferences on technology topics, including the Web 2.0 Summit, the Web 2.0 Expo, the O'Reilly Open Source Convention, the Gov 2.0 Summit, and the Gov 2.0 Expo. Tim's blog, the O'Reilly Radar, "watches the alpha geeks" to determine emerging technology trends, and serves as a platform for advocacy about issues of importance to the technical community. Tim's long-term vision for his company is to change the world by spreading the knowledge of innovators. In addition to O'Reilly Media, Tim is a founder of Safari Books Online, a pioneering subscription service for accessing books online, and O'Reilly AlphaTech Ventures, an early-stage venture firm.

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• Interesting subject.
  2003-08-04 23:57:10  rascasse [Reply | View]
  
  
  I don't find baseball to be particularly interesting, but a sport that I find to be fascinating is probably considered to be even more boring than baseball to that sport's detractors. I really enjoy Formula One, especially because of the statistical and game theory aspects of it. To a casual observer, it's all about the race. But for me, the race is a culmination of 2 weeks - the period since the previous race - worth of research, development and fine tuning. In F1, statistics don't just characterize the sport, they define it.
  
  Of course, if F1 were simply a numbers game it just wouldn't appeal to me because it would be far too deterministic. Like all things statistical, the more knowledge gained in F1, the more questions that crop up. In 2002, Bridgestone tires were better than their Michelin counterparts; enough to "split" the field at some races with all the Bridgestone runners ahead of the Michelins. But why? Was it their construction? The type of rubber compound used? Their rate of wear throughout a race? Their affects on overall car aerodynamics? Or did the results have little to do with the tire and more to do with the car and driver? So many questions. So few and precious resources to allocate to answering them. Interestingly enough, in 2003 the Michelins are the better tire, so they may have done a good job answering the questions that mattered.
  
  Not having read this book, only having read this blog entry and Amazon feedback, it appears Billy Beane has a knack for determining which questions matter. However, one of his weaknesses may be in how he answers these questions. His sabermetrics might indicate that his first base defense is weak. But is that because of the first basemen? Or is the pitcher allowing too many groundball hits to right field? Or, having shuffled with his team so often, is his catcher and pitcher not working optimally in their pitching strategy and causing a needless amount of hits that could result in misplays and errors further down the defensive chain? In answering these questions and finding the cause to be the performance of a particular player, is the answer to train him, trade him, or shuffle him to another position? Are there any mitigating factors to his performance that cannot be accurately measured? For instance, has he been having marital problems recently? Did you just trade away his best friend on the team?
  
  I often find that people fascinated by statistics become overwhelmed by them because of these exhausting iterations of questions the statistics prompt. 4 years of solid performance is quite an achievement on the part of Billy Beane. But what will really be great is if he can stay the course and lead the As to championships instead of being bogged down by poor decisions (or perhaps indecision) based on the ever increasing amount of information he is compiling. In fact, Billy Beane's archilles heel is that he's so good at dumping weaknesses in his team and filling them with strengths that no GM in his/her right mind would contemplate making a trade with him. Why trade with Billy Beane if he's only dumping somebody he's determined to be flawed and requesting somebody he's determined to be an asset? If nobody wants to trade with him, does he have to start trading good players? How does that upset the team balance? I would say if given 10 years of solid performance, I will be extremely impressed with Beane. But even the latest stock market bubble looked good in the short term. It's longer term prospects weren't so bright.

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